islamin malasya

1. The arrival of Islam in Malaysia
The absence of a comprehensive document concerning the coming of Islam to Malasyia led to the emergence of various theories about when and from where Islam first spread of this State. Azmi for example, argues that Islam came first to Malasyia since the 7th century AD This opinion is based on an argument that by mid-century, Islamic traders have come to the group of islands wither. Muslim Arab traders who stopped at the Port Commerce Indonesia would also stop at ports Malasyia trade. One of the places of which they are singgahi Kedah, Trengganu, and Malacca.
Another hypothesis put forward by Fatimi, that Islam came first around the 8th century H (14 AD He was holding on to the discovery of inscribed stones at Trenganu dated 702H (1303M). Inscribed stone was written in Arabic script. On a side contain a statement ordered the authorities and the government to hold fast to the beliefs of Islam and the teachings of the Prophet.
In addition, Majul said that Islam first arrived in Malaysia around the 15th century and to-16M. These two arguments both Fatimi and Majul, also unacceptable, because there is strong evidence to show that Islam had arrived long before that, the century-3 H (10 M). This last opinion recited the discovery of the tombstone at Cape Britain, Kedah in 1965. on the tombstone is written the name of Sheikh Abd. Al-Qadir Ibn Hussein Shah who died in 291 H (940 M).
Both Fatini nor Majul does not seem to know about the discovery of the tombstone in Kedah this promontory. And writing about it in the magazine Mastika because the writing was published in 1965 while they study each produced in 1963 and 1964. We can conclude that Islam arrived in Malaysia in the 10th century AD

   1. Penetration or spread of Islam in Malaysia
As is generally known, before Islam came to the ground Malay, Malay people are followers of animism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. However, since his arrival, Islam has gradually started to believed and accepted as a new religion by society Malay Archipelago.

   1. Perkembanagn isalam dimalaysia
Malaysia's population consists of diverse ethnic and religious. Of the 23 million people the number of Muslims is only 58.6% remaining 18.4% consists of adherents of Buddhist, Christian 6.4% and 5.3% Hindu. However, images and more subtle nuances of Islam. It can be seen from the comparison of a number of countries with a population of Muslims and non-Muslims who are nearly balanced, only Malaysia that provides a lot of pressure on the symbols, institutions and practice of Islam. This can be proved starting from the declaration of the government to revise the national legal system to be more in harmony with Islamic law, the declaration of the government to reconstruct the model and system of the Malaysian economy into a model of Islam, followed by the provision of infrastructure and instusi instusi Islam-such as Bank Islam, Islamic Insurance , Islamic mortgage, the Foundation of Islamic Economics, the formation of the group number of Islamic power, as well as a special group of Islamic rule, and so forth.
Why does Islam feel stronger in Malaysia compared to Indonesia where the population 90% of Bergama Islam? It is caused by a factor of historical development of Islam which has become an integral part of Malay political developments since the time of the Malacca sultanate.
The following will be described in broad outline of the factors in a phase of Malaysia's history starting from the arrival of Islam to the contemporary development of Islam that helped contribute to the strong awareness of Islam in Malaysia.

   1. As a Malay Islamic identity
Islam for the Malays is not only a belief but also has become their identity and become the basis of Malay culture. Malay traditional clothes for example has been adapted to what is recommended by Islam.
Throughout the history of a very close association between Islam with Malay culture and identity is something that is acceptable in general. "Since throw beliefs and embrace Islam Animism dive kingdom of Melaka (15th century), the Nation wilt never change religions. Islam has become an integral part of national identity, history, law, political and cultural entity wither. Therefore, it is not surprising that Islam is considered as a major component of Malay culture, and as a major element of Malay identity.
In the political field of government, there are also conceptual and political thought influenced by the teachings of Islam. So the Malay-based political tradition hindu budha before the arrival of Islam has been replaced by ideas that are inspired by al-Quran and other Islamic sources.
However, due to British colonization, Malay Islamic identity was subject to degradation, because not infrequently the colonial create policies that undermine the function and role of Islam in Malay. Malay land occupiers, the UK has led to the weakening of Islamic values ​​that have been pervasive in the Malay traditional order. Colonialism was tidajk limited economic and political aspects alone but including also the colonial mind and cultures.

   1. Islamic Revival in Malaysia
Islamic Revival in Malaysi visible efforts on Malaysian Muslims to practice Islam more seriously as active prayers in congregation at the mosque, attending lectures wirid, be careful in buying food in order not consumed in an unclean, wear Muslim clothing that characterizes ketaaatan as a Muslim. This occurred in the 1970s and reached the peak in the 1980s.
Furthermore, government efforts to raise the broadcasting of Islam and is also seen from its efforts to build a mosque. Not a few number of mosques and mosque that was built and facilitated even programs coordinated by the government. Islam also developed a broadcasting business conducted by bodies such as the Foundation of Islamic da'wah. The Foundation was established in January 25, 1974 is aimed at:

   1. Organizing and coordinating the activities of regeneration Da'i Da'wah
   2. Improving the quality of Islamic da'wah
   3. meyatukan energy and mind and develop a strong and orderly sequence to carry out jihad, upholding the welfare and eradicate kemungkaran
From the description above we can conclude that one factor causes the strong ethos of Islam in Malaysia because of Islam into the political kepanggung Malaysia, but it is also caused by berkelindannya mutual relationship between Islam and kemalayuan since the days of empire. Islam is not only a religion but also recognized as an identity. What really helped raise the position of Islam in Malaysia is the support of the Islamic State. Only a few Muslim countries in the world that went so far as Malaysia in its efforts to utilize state power nTo implement the provisions of Islamic teachings in the life of the Muslims.

asal islam di malesya

ISLAM IN MALAYSIA, CONSTITUTIONAL

AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES

Salbiah Ahmad

Introduction

This advocacy paper seeks to examine the constitutional implications pertaining to  Islam in the context of Malaysia as a modern postcolonial state with a written constitution which spells the Constitution as supreme law with “Islam as  religion of the Federation”.[1]

Malaysia gained its independence on August 31, 1957. For a long time after independence, it has been largely assumed that  Malaysia is a secular state in that the basis of its laws is the English Common law. Malaysia inherits a Westminster-style of government with parliamentary democracy.

Its federal laws are basically English Common law in orientation. However its state laws are mainly Islamic laws. This is because Malaysia has a parallel legal system of Civil and Islamic laws. State laws are Islamic laws. Federal law is Civil law.

In the beginning of the 1980s, the government ruled by a coalition headed by the United Malays National Organisation or Umno embarked on an Islamisation programme which included an agenda to upgrade the Islamic legal system as well. This involved the upgrading of the administration of Islamic law at the State level.  One of the major development in this area is a Constitutional amendment in 1988 to demarcate the powers of the State Courts from the Civil Courts.

State Courts are not courts of record. They have no powers of judicial review which remain vested in the superior Civil High Courts. Fundamental liberties are adjudicated through the Civil Courts by the superior High Courts.

What has happened over the years is a curious situation where there is a denial of one’s fundamental liberties if a case is perceived to have come under the purview of the State Syariah Courts. Thus for example in a case of conversion out of Islam, the matter is perceived to be one of conversion of Muslims and not one of freedom of religion, in which case the High Courts have refused jurisdiction.

Recently in April 2004, the High Court has refused to hear an application by a non- Muslim parent for a declaration that the conversion of her minor children to Islam was                                                                                                invalid. The Court ruled that the matter should be heard by the Syariah court. The marriage was a civil marriage and the children were born of that civil marriage. The father became a Muslim and he converted his minor children without the consent and knowledge of their natural mother who remained Hindu.

Syariah Courts have no jurisdiction over non-Muslims whatsoever. The Civil Court’s jurisdiction is regardless of religion and is tied to the subject matter of the dispute, except in cases where the State Syariah Court has jurisdiction. Increasingly this is the stand the majority of the High Court cases have taken.  This stand has in many situations led to discriminatory consequences which then brings into disrepute the basic premises of the Rule of Law.

These decisions involving applicants or complaints where one party is Islam have another dimension. Where the non-Muslim party is without recourse the matter is seen as one privileging Islam and thus impinging upon the principles of equal citizenship and freedom of religion. There have been situations where Muslims have also been denied freedom of religion as State Islamic law has no provision for leaving Islam or if it does it comes with criminal sanctions. The Civil High Courts have refused to grant the freedom to leave Islam for Muslims despite the guarantee of religious freedom under the Constitution. In one case, a decision on appeal ruled that a Muslim who wishes to leave Islam may do so only if at the time of conversion to Islam, that person did not become Muslim willingly. The case was “justified” on the facts that the person in question was a convert to Islam. Thus this decision of the Civil Court will not extend to situations where the person is a born Muslim that is a person born out of a marriage where both parents are Muslim.

The problems that have arisen cannot be resolved merely legally or jurisprudentially. Many of these concerns require some political resolution. This is not an easy task. While the written Constitution is declared supreme, Islam is religion of the Federation. Until this is clarified politically and legally, the legal system would not be able to provide redress in hard cases.

The problems basically relate to two areas:

• Subjecting non-Muslims to Islamic law or principles more exclusive to Islam
• Subjecting Muslims to an Islamic fiqh principle (as legislated) which is contrary to humanistic principles whether grounded in Islamic traditions or human rights

In Malaysia both of these situations has occurred and the resolution and management of these situations has not met with political or legal success. There is no easy resolution of the conflicts in these types of situations. Much of the difficulty is related to Malaysia’s constitutional arrangements on Islam and Civil law and the “rightful place of Islam”  in a country where the constitution reigns supreme but with Islam as religion of the Federation.

The question posed is whether it is possible to use human rights as the basis of engagements between Civil and Islamic Law in the context of multi-cultural Malaysia? It is envisaged that the forum would be the Civil High Courts with the challenge being one on fundamental liberties.

Situations where Human Rights principles become relevant

1. Where legislated Islamic law (fiqh) denies fundamental liberties

-          Freedom of religion

-          Equality

2. Conflict of civil and Islamic law

-          Conversion of minors

-          Ancillary claims to spouse whose marriage has ended upon the conversion of the other party to Islam

-          Custody of children in such cases

It will be noted even at the outset that (1) would appear to be more contentious than (2). In (2) there is always that possibility of piecemeal legislation or perhaps developing a family law court which has jurisdiction over the dispute in conflict for example in a case where one spouse converts to Islam or leaves Islam in a civil marriage or Muslim marriage respectively.   These concerns would be addressed subsequently.

The main reason in proposing a human rights approach in these cases, at least in the context of Malaysia, there is some reluctance shown by Civil Court judges in adjudicating matters which may mean judging over Islamic law or having to expound on Islamic law principles to which they do not have federal law to be guided by.  The case is complicated I think when Muslim judges are on the bench in the Civil High Court over these matters. There is an apparent difficulty for them to maintain , in Michael Perry’s words, a “critical distance”. [2] The proposal of applying human rights principles may be more palatable for the High Court . This is the reality.

Judges fear to tread on what they perceive to be “theological questions” as opposed to principles of law. There is of course the possibility of persuading the Civil Court judges to receive evidence of fiqh and alternative interpretations of fiqh through expert evidence of scholars. This is a minefield for judges. Many think that, that may be a political question that might be properly resolved by elected representatives. The apprehensions are understandable.

However no amount of scholarship and pontification would make changes in the adjudication of rights until and unless these matters are tested and tried at the practical level. Most human rights defenders and lawyers in any case think that judges must just be persuaded to take the best course of action when a case lands before them in court. The more the judges are exposed to these matters, they more familiarity they have over them. They have to decide and address the problems posed. Some lawyers think that it is a question of being familiar with the issues. But we have to be prepared to bring before the judge the principles by which his judgment may be exercised in these contentious matters.

One has to address religion in the public sphere as well. In a multi-prong and comprehensive approach to rights and legal strategies, the “cultural-political” sphere has to be addressed. This sphere shapes political and moral opinions which will generally inform the courts and legislators.

Thus a comprehensive human rights approach involves the following spheres:

1. Institutions (Structures)

-courts

-legislature

-enforcement

(lobbying for change)

2. Cultural (Behaviour)

-public awareness, education, training  (deliberative transformative politics)

-lobbying for change

3. Substance (The Law)

-reformation of laws

-developing methodology

-transformative theology

-lobbying for change

To borrow a turn of phrase from Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim, there must be a “synergy” in these three spheres. This framework to examine legal strategies is one developed by human rights activists in the network of women and law.[3]

I am also attracted to the perspective offered by An-Naim in working solutions through the synergy of human rights, religion and secularism.[4] This perspective I think is not too different from that posed by Michael J. Perry when he frames the question as not whether to mix religion and politics, but how to mix religion and politics.[5] These are broad frameworks which require further translation at the point of practical application as for example in court arguments as opposed to a deliberative, transformative public debate.

Thus a Human Rights approach is wider than a “purely legal” approach where for instance once merely targets law reform or develop litigation techniques or legal arguments. A Human Rights approach in the Civil Courts is not necessarily limited to the use of principles of international conventions. Malaysia for instance has only ratified two international conventions. This is the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979 or CEDAW. There are basic principles of human rights which may be deemed to be customary international law.

The “Hard” Issues in Relation to Malaysia’s Constitutional Arrangements

These relate to the following:

1. Whether the state is a secular state or Islamic state
2. Whether Islamic law or English Common Law is the law of the land
3. What is the meaning of Art 121(1A) in the Constitution which states that the High Court has no jurisdiction over matters where the Syariah court has jurisdiction
4. How these issues relate to equal citizenship and religious freedom under the social contract crafted at Independence
5. Whether Muslims are to be treated differently from non-Muslims and vice versa on account of the ‘right’ interpretations to the constitutional arrangements, or whether equal citizenship and religious freedom should be accorded to all Malaysians regardless of faith, ethnicity, class and gender

These concerns are both legal and political.

The Secular State and Islam

There is nothing in the Federal Constitution to say that it is a secular state.  The fact that there is a clause to say that Islam is religion of the Federation does not necessarily mean that the Federation is not a secular state.

The issue of a secular state did arise in one of the more important memoranda submitted to the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission (1956-1957) under Lord Reid.[6] This was the 20 page Alliance memorandum. The Alliance won 51 out of 52 contested seats in the 1955 elections to the First Legislative Council. It is a coalition of Umno, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC).

Most of the official constitutional documents of the Commission including the minutes of their meetings, correspondence, oral evidence and memoranda were classified until recently. This included the papers of Sir Ivor Jennings who was the draftsman of the final draft Constitution. [7]

The Alliance proposed that “the religion of Malaya shall be Islam.” It however noted that the “observance of this principle shall not impose any disability on non-Muslim nationals professing and practising their own religions and shall not imply that the State is not a secular State.”

The Commission did not include the Alliance proposal. It had instead considered the representations of the Rulers through the Rulers’ counsel that the Alliance request would affect their position as head of Islam in their respective States: “It is Their Highnesses’ considered view that it would not be desirable to insert some declaration such has been suggested that the Muslim Faith or Islamic Faith be the established religion of the Federation.” [8]

Sir Ivor Jennings, a member of the Commission in his private notes on the Commission’s report felt that the religion of a minority or the majority should not be formally established for the reason he disliked the establishment of the Church of England: “I do not think that Islam needs the power of the state to support it”. [9]

The Commission had in its 34^th meeting expressed concern over the contradiction between the Alliance declaration that Malays would be a secular state and the provision for Islam to be the official religion of the Federation. They sought to clarify the matter with the Alliance at a meeting on September 26, 1957 but did not get to raise the matter in that meeting which took a little over two hours.[10]

The Commission had also considered the views of the public which did not support an official religion for the Federation. The Commission received memoranda from the Eurasian Union, the Malayan Tamils Association and the Straits Chinese British Association of Malacca. It also received a confidential letter from the Secretary of State stressing the need to ensure that the Constitution guaranteed the freedom of religion. The receipt of the said letter was minuted in the 23^rd meeting of the Commission. [11]

The Commission placed Islam as a primary matter in the State Legislative List and retained the Ruler as head of Islam in his own State. The Reid Report noted that “There is nothing in the draft Constitution to affect the continuance of the present position in the States with regard to recognition of Islam or to prevent the recognition of Islam in the Federation by legislators or otherwise in any respect which does not prejudice the civil rights of individual non-Muslims”. [12]

The Commission had deliberated the Alliance request for an official religion in their 34^th meeting in 1956 and had expressed reservations at the contradiction in the memoranda that the Federation is to be a secular state and the provision for Islam as the official religion. The Commission had intended to seek a clarification with the Alliance in a meeting but that question did not come up in the meeting which took about a little more than two hours. [13]

All the Commissioners are agreed not to provide for an official religion clause. However one of the Commissioners, Justice Abdul Hamid from Pakistan wrote a separate Note of Dissent when the Commissioners met for the last time in February 1957 in Rome, to support the inclusion of Islam as the official religion. It was delivered at a late stage in the proceedings and fuelled much controversy. He did not in his Note of Dissent made any reference to the fact that he had earlier agreed not to have an official religion clause. His Note referred to various matters pertaining to the special position of the Malays and citizenship. In recommending Islam to be the religion of the State, Hamid said:

            It was also recommended (by the Alliance) that it should be made clear in that provision that a declaration to the above effect will not impose any disability on non-Muslim citizens in professing, propagating and practising their religions, and will not prevent the State from being a secular State. [14]

Hamid supported this inclusion on the basis that not less than fifteen countries have such a clause in their constitutions. In these countries, Hamid said that it “has not been found to have caused hardships to anybody” and that no harm will ensue if such a declaration is included.[15] He did not however draw a distinction of the homogeneity in those countries, while Malaya was multi-cultural.  He further said that all the State Constitutions (of Malaya) has an official religion clause and all that is required is “to embed it in the Federal”.

The draft Constitution went through a Working Group stage and a meeting in London with the British Government representatives before its passage to Parliament. The official religion clause was included at the Working Committee stage as it was agreed upon by the Alliance and the Malay based opposition political parties of Party Negara and the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP). The Working Committee comprised of members of the Alliance. The opposition Malay based parties had their own Congress to discuss the draft Constitution and Independence.

The British Government were more concerned about long term strategic and economic interests with Malaya. This included the stationing of troops in the Federation to fulfil its international obligations under SEATO or the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation in the wake of the continuing Cold War. [16] They much preferred that the negotiations to the draft constitution be purely a local matter between the Rulers and the political parties.

Nasr[17] is of the view that Islam was brought into the nationalist discourse before independence as a "uniformalising influence". He explains that the Japanese occupation changed the face of Malayan politics. The British were routed. The end of the occupation saw a vacuum in national leadership. The Malays looked towards the Kaum Muda "young Turks" (which included reformist Islamists) for leadership and guidance:

            The Japanese interregnum therefore raised Malay political awareness. This awareness laid the foundations of peninsula-wide Malay nationalism. That nationalism, moreover, included Islamic arguments and symbols, not only because the Malays had turned to orthodox and reformist ulama for leadership during the Japanese occupation-the time when their nationalist perspective was taking shape-but also because a peninsula-wide conception of Malay nationalism needed the uniformalising influence of Islam. Across the Malay peninsula significant variations in custom (adat), popular religious practices, and dialect existed, distinguishing between regions and states. In the absence of a widely shared sense of nation in lieu of allegiance tom states and sultans, Islam became an indispensable component of peninsular-wide Malay identity and nationalism.[18]

Islam was the rallying call of Malay nationalism on Independence Day. It is open whether the political parties and the Malayan peoples had intended Islam to have an outreach beyond being an identity of the Malay ethnic group. The negotiations after the draft Constitution was received by the political parties did not show any marked debate on “Islam as religion of the Federation”. The furious debates within the Alliance and the Opposition parties were around issues of the review of Malay special privileges, language and citizenship.

After the 10th General Election in 1999, the issue of an Islamic state for Malaysia was roused by the party in power in the State of Terengganu. The Parti SeIslam Malaysia or PAS formed the State government in Terengganu in 1999. Pas is the State government in Kelantan since 1990 after a hiatus. All other States are ruled by the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition under the leadership of Umno. The PAS government in Terengganu had raised the issue of an Islamic state for Malaysia. The 4^th Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamed subsequently announced on September 29, 2001 that Malaysia is already an Islamic State. This marked a struggle for power between States and the Federal centre and sharpened the race for control of Malay politics between PAS and Umno. This announcement also created uneasiness and created renewed interest in the meaning of “Islam as religion of the Federation”.[19]

Ayubi, in his seminal work, Political Islam, [20] opined that the lack of social representativeness of the State was often compensated for by the State adopting religion in an attempt to impart an ideological or cultural cohesiveness on the society:

            “Opposition to the State in such circumstances is difficult to communicate in purely oppositional terms. Opposition may therefore take the form of trying to remove the ruling group and to replace it altogether, usually militarily-i.e. to take over the ‘control keys’ of the society. Opposition may also take the form of social and ideological protest. Since the State has claimed for itself a religious raison d’etre, protest movements may also feel tempted to express their opposition in religious terms.. the State..claims (and often appears) to be the guardian or order against chaos and disintegration, of reason against rationality and stupidity.[21]

           

Malaysia upon independence had inherited the colonial state as do all former British dominions. As the Constitution recognise the primacy of Islam for the States, Islamic laws were passed from time to time on matters prescribed in the State List.  These matters are of no application to Muslims.

In 1988 a constitutional amendment was effected to provide more autonomy for the State Syariah Courts. Art. 121(1A) provides that the High Court shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts.[22] This was primarily inserted to clarify the jurisdiction of the State Syariah Courts and the Federal Civil Courts.

This amendment was seen as giving effect to “Islam as religion of the Federation” clause. It was a step to prevent cases meant to be heard in State Courts on the basis of an existing State Islamic law from being brought before the High Court where that Court may have concurrent jurisdiction on the subject matter under a Federal law. It was seen to be more of a “housekeeping” amendment. However there are ‘unintended consequences’ to that amendment as we shall see subsequently.

Mahathir’s ‘Islamic state’ is really  more of a statist developmental model which succeeded. Islamism or Umno’s political Islam takes for granted and seeks to work through the (postcolonial) nation-state. Nasr was of the opinion that Mahathir’s islamisation was a tool used to serve state interest:

Islamisation served the interests of weak post-colonial states at a critical juncture. It allowed states to survive challenges to their authority, and provided them with ideological tools that allowed them to expand their power and reach and to create greater harmony in state-society relations at a time when society was turning to Islam. Malaysia used the ensuing stability more successfully to pursue economic growth. On the downside, Islamisation allowed states to avoid fundamental reforms in their economies, political structures, and policy making as it facilitated expansion of state power through successful manipulation of ideology rather than rationalisation of the structure and working of state institutions. Islamisation has also allowed the state to regulate more and to spread its tentacles into civil society and the private lives of citizens. [23]

Thus Islam did have a greater role in society and politics but this is limited to enhance the state’s capacity. Mahathir’s islamisation was threefold: the establishment of an Islamic financial sector, an Islamic higher education system and an international bureaucracy. These provided Islamic legitimacy to the state and Islamic law was used to assert social control.[24]

Nasr notes for instance that IKIM or the Institute of Islamic Understanding of Malaysia was established by Mahathir in 1992 to primarily relate Islam to globalisation and capitalist development. IKIM justified the pursuit of wealth, rationalised globalisation, consumerism, foreign investment, limited labour rights, income inequality and the like. [25]

Ayubi offers an insight into this phenomenon:

            The point to be emphasised here is that rulers did not become authoritarian because their ruler was inspired by certain essential tenets of Islam; rather the Islamic theory of politics was developed gradually and piecemeal (and mainly in response to social and ideological opposition from the various protest movements), by jurists who played the role of the ideologues of rulers. The rulers were in control of the producers and of the economic surplus in their society and looking increasingly for an ideological rationale to legitimise their control of people and resources. [26]

Islamic law and State Islamic Courts are domain of States. However the functioning, oversight and control were placed at the Federal Centre through several bureaucracies set up to streamline the administration of justice, including the appointment and training of judges. In this way the government wrested power from the States, it gained more control over Islamic issues and it used Islamic law to assert social control.  The State Courts became answerable to the Centre. The revival of Islam was limited to the mere implementation of the Syariah. [27]

Thus after 1983, State Muslim laws were effectively revamped by introduction of a more comprehensive codification of traditional fiqh in its family laws, limited criminal laws (ta-azir) and procedural laws. Talal Asad refers to this procedure as the “secularisation of (Islamic) law” in Eqypt.[28] Reforming Islam in Malaysia is ‘reforming’ its law basically through talfiq and takhayyur of the nineteenth century formulation of Islamic tradition.[29] Malaysia’s Islamisation of laws is like Pakistan’s “Sharitisation”.[30]